Friday, December 29, 2006

Resolutions for a Post-Peak (oil) New Year

by John Michael Greer
Published on 27 Dec 2006 by The Archdruid Report. Archived on 27 Dec 2006.

To my mind, the traditional habit of New Year’s resolutions has much to recommend it. Though it’s proverbial that most such resolutions are already on the endangered species list a week after the new year begins, and end up in the fossil record somewhere between the brontosaurs and last election’s campaign promises by the time February comes within sight, the idea of entering a new year with new aspirations is a good one. As 2007 approaches, worldwide conventional oil production remains noticeably below its 2005 peak, and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East and elsewhere promises at least its share of oil crises and economic shocks in the months and years to come.

Thus a set of New Year’s resolutions for a world on the brink of the deindustrial age seems timely just now. There’s plenty of material on the web right now about the mechanics of peak oil, and a fair amount on what we can expect once industrial civilization starts tobogganing down the far side of Hubbert’s Peak, but too many of the suggestions for what can be done about it either remain fixated on survivalist fantasies of apocalypse or go chasing after equally unlikely dreams of large-scale political reform. Mick Winter’s excellent new book Peak Oil Prep (and the accompanying website www.PeakOilPrep.com) takes a large step in the right direction. Still, I have my own list of suggested resolutions.

For some people the following ideas will be impractical, and for almost everyone they will be at least a little inconvenient. All of them, however, will be an inescapable part of the reality most Americans will have to live with in the future – and quite possibly the very near future, at that. The sooner people concerned with peak oil and the rest of the predicament of industrial society make changes like these in their own lives, the better able they will be to surf the waves of industrial decline and help other people make the transition toward sustainability.

1. Replace your incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescents
2. Retrofit your home for energy conservation
3. Cut back on your gasoline consumption.
4. Plant an organic vegetable garden
5. Compost your food waste
6. Take up a handicraft
7. Adopt an “obsolete” technology
8. Take charge of your own health care
9. Help build your local community
10. Explore your spirituality Read the full article on Energy BulletinEnergy Bulletin, peak oil news clearinghouse

Wednesday, December 27, 2006

The Iranian petroleum crisis and United States

PNAS
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Roger Stern*
Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, The Johns Hopkins University, 3400 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218
Edited by Ronald W. Jones, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, and approved October 31, 2006 (received for review May 16, 2006)

The U.S. case against Iran is based on Iran’s deceptions regarding
nuclear weapons development. This case is buttressed by assertions
that a state so petroleum-rich cannot need nuclear power to
preserve exports, as Iran claims. The U.S. infers, therefore, that
Iran’s entire nuclear technology program must pertain to weapons
development. However, some industry analysts project an Irani oil
export decline [e.g., Clark JR (2005) Oil Gas J 103(18):34–39]. If such
a decline is occurring, Iran’s claim to need nuclear power could be
genuine. Because Iran’s government relies on monopoly proceeds
from oil exports for most revenue, it could become politically
vulnerable if exports decline. Here, we survey the political economy
of Irani petroleum for evidence of this decline. We define
Iran’s export decline rate (edr) as its summed rates of depletion and
domestic demand growth, which we find equals 10–12%. We
estimate marginal cost per barrel for additions to Irani production
capacity, from which we derive the ‘‘standstill’’ investment required
to offset edr. We then compare the standstill investment to
actual investment, which has been inadequate to offset edr. Even
if a relatively optimistic schedule of future capacity addition is met,
the ratio of 2011 to 2006 exports will be only 0.40–0.52. A more
probable scenario is that, absent some change in Irani policy, this
ratio will be 0.33–0.46 with exports declining to zero by 2014–
2015. Energy subsidies, hostility to foreign investment, and inefficiencies
of its state-planned economy underlie Iran’s problem,
which has no relation to ‘‘peak oil.’’
The U.S. has projected military force in the Persian Gulf for two
decades. The policy aims to preempt emergence of a regional
superpower (1). However, preemption of Iraq has been accomplished
only after two wars and an occupation. These costly
exercises have not slowed Iran’s procession toward regional superpower
status but rather may have accelerated it (2).
Iran’s rise illuminates a flaw in preemption policy. The flaw is
that force projection is not a remedy for the underlying economic
problem, market power. Oil cartel states exert market power to
collect monopoly rents. In a lawless region such as the Gulf, each
states’ rents are a potential war prize to another. If rents could be
aggregated by wars of seizure, a Gulf superpower would emerge, as
was Iraq’s aim in invading Iran and Kuwait. Yet, although U.S. force
projection prevents wars of seizure, rents still flow.
Force projection thus keeps a peace in which cartel states can
collect monopoly rents sufficient to attain near-superpower status,
evenwithout wars of seizure. Market power thereby perpetuates the
need for force projection, whereas force projection protects the
cartel states that exert market power. This paradox guarantees that
the U.S. militarywill remain in the Gulf until some policy is adopted
to reduce market power.
U.S. failure to confront market power is not an oversight,
however. It is a policy whose premise is that cartel states must be
appeased to secure their oil exports (3). This conception is based in
turn on the perceived threat of an ‘‘oil weapon’’ (4), a fiction U.S.
officials have believed for five decades. Whatever the shortcomings
of past policy, the present concern is how to prevent a terror sponsor
from attaining nuclear weapons or contain it if it does.
The U.S. case for action against Iran is based on its deceptions
with respect to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). However, this case is buttressed with assertions
about Irani petroleum:
Finally, there is Iran’s claim that it is building massive
and expensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities to meet future
electricity needs, while preserving oil and gas for export.
All of this strains credulity. Iran’s gas reserves are the
second largest in the world. [Yet] Iran flares enough gas
annually to generate electricity equivalent to the output
of four Bushehr reactors.†
Given the historic difficulties that U.S. policymakers have had with
petroleum economics, it seems possible that these assertions are
wrong. Iran is guilty of NPT deceptions, but it cannot be inferred
from this that all Irani claims must be false. The regime’s dependence
on export revenue suggests that it could need nuclear power
as badly as it claims. Recent analyses by former National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) officials project that oil exports could go to zero
within 12–19 years (5, 6). It therefore seems possible that Iran’s
claim to need nuclear power might be genuine, an indicator of
distress from anticipated export revenue shortfalls. If so, the Irani
regime may be more vulnerable than is presently understood. Here
we survey Iran’s petroleum economy for evidence of oil export
decline that might suggest such vulnerability.‡
Petroleum Sector Overview
Most Irani oil export revenues are monopoly rents, which comprised
63% of Irani state revenues in 2004 (4). Rents derive from
the difference between market price and competitive price, which
is the sum of marginal production cost plus return to capital. For
states like Iran that subsidize domestic petroleum demand, such
dependence can be problematic. If subsidies call forth demand
growth in excess of production growth, the exportable fraction of
production will decline.

Click hear to read the complete article in PDF

Monday, December 25, 2006

Basquiat -- A tribute

A video collage with Velvet Underground's Heroine playing in the back ground

Wednesday, December 20, 2006

Akira Kurosawa

Considering that these trailers were originally produced to advertise the films, they are offered here with the belief that there is no copyright infringement -- please contact me if you think otherwise.

French trailer for Ran

Madadayo

Rhapsody in August

Seven Samurai

Dodesukaden

Tuesday, December 19, 2006

Monday, December 11, 2006

The Roman Empire Is Falling - So It Turns To Iran and Syria (n Empire)

By Robert Fisk Independent
December 7, 2006

The Roman Empire is falling. That, in a phrase, is what the Baker report says. The legions cannot impose their rule on Mesopotamia. Just as Crassus lost his legions' banners in the deserts of Syria-Iraq, so has George W Bush. There is no Mark Antony to retrieve the honour of the empire. The policy "is not working". "Collapse" and "catastrophe" - words heard in the Roman senate many a time - were embedded in the text of the Baker report. Et tu, James?

This is also the language of the Arab world, always waiting for the collapse of empire, for the destruction of the safe Western world which has provided it with money, weapons, political support. First, the Arabs trusted the British Empire and Winston Churchill, and then they trusted the American Empire and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and all the other men who would give guns to the Israelis and billions to the Arabs - Nixon, Carter, Clinton, Bush...

And now they are told that the Americans are not winning the war; that they are losing. If you were an Arab, what would you do?

Be sure, they are not asking this question in Washington. The Middle East - so all-important (supposedly) in the "war on terror" - in itself, a myth - doesn't really matter in the White House. It is a district, a map, a region, every bit as amorphous as the crescent of "crisis" which the Clinton administration invented when it wanted to land its troops in Somalia. How to get out, how to save face, that's the question. To hell with the people who live there: the Arabs, the Iraqis, the men, women and children whom we kill - and whom the Iraqis kill - every day.

Note how our "spokesmen" in Afghanistan now acknowledge the dead woman and children of Nato airstrikes as if it is quite in order to slaughter these innocents because we are at war with the horrid Taliban.

Some of the same mindset has arrived in Baghdad, where "coalition" spokesmen also - from time to time - jump in front of the video-tape evidence by accepting that they, too, kill women and children in their war against "terror". But it is the sentences of impotence that doom empires. "The ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing." There is a risk of a "slide towards chaos [sic] [that] could trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a humanitarian catastrophe."

But hasn't that already happened? "Collapse" and "catastrophe" are daily present in Iraq. America's ability "to influence events" has been absent for years. And let's just re-read the following sentence: "Violence is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency. Shiite [Shia] militias, death squads, al-Qa'ida and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability."

Come again? Where was this "widespread criminality," this "sectarian conflict" when Saddam, our favourite war criminal, was in power? What do the Iraqis think about this? And how typical that the American media went at once to hear Bush's view of the Baker report - rather than the reaction of the Iraqis, those who are on the receiving end of our self-induced tragedy in Mesopotamia.

They will enjoy the idea that American troops should be "embedded" with Iraqi forces - not so long ago, it was the press that had to be "embedded" with the Americans! - as if the Romans were ready to put their legions amid the Goths, Ostrogoths and Visigoths to ensure their loyalty.

What the Romans did do, of course - and what the Americans would never do - is offer their subjects Roman citizenship. Every tribe - in Gaul or Bythinia or Mesopotamia - who fell under Roman rule became a citizen of Rome. What could Washington have done with Iraq if it had offered American citizenship to every Iraqi? There would have been no insurrection, no violence, no collapse or catastrophe, no Baker report. But no. We wanted to give these people the fruits of our civilisation - not the civilisation itself. From this, they were banned.

And the result? The nations we supposedly hated - Iran and Syria - are now expected to save us from ourselves. "Given the ability [sic] of Iran and Syria to influence events and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage [sic] them constructively."

I love those words. Especially "engage". Yes, the "influence of America" is diminishing. The influence of Syria and Iran is growing. That just about sums up the "war on terror". Any word yet, I wonder, from Lord Blair of Kut al-Amara?

The Strategies

The Baker panel considered four options, all of which it rejected:

Cut And Run

Baker believes it would cause a humanitarian disaster, while al-Qa'ida would expand further.

Stay The Course

Baker accepts that current US policy is not working. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The US is spending $2bn (�1bn) a week and has lost public support.

Send In More Troops

Increases in US troop levels would not solve the cause of violence in Iraq. Violence would simply rekindle as soon as US forces moved.

Regional Devolution

If the country broke up into its Shia, Sunni and Kurd regions, it would lead to ethnic cleansing and mass population moves.

Baker outlines a fifth option - 'responsible transition' - in which the number of US forces could be increased to shore up the Iraqi army while it takes over primary responsibility for combat operations. US troops would then decrease slowly.

Thursday, December 7, 2006

Sunday, December 3, 2006

party of the century


or The night the beautiful people died
Forty years ago Truman Capote threw a party that was meant to announce his arrival in society's best circles. Instead, he unwittingly made it clear that the world he so desperately wanted to be part of was in its death throes, writes Richard Ouzounian
They danced through the night, then walked out into the dawn and discovered that the world they knew was gone.This Tuesday, Nov. 28, will mark the 40th anniversary of The Black and White Ball, a vain caprice that Truman Capote conceived one June night in the Hamptons, only to see it escalate six months later into the seismic social event of its decade.By the time the last plate of scrambled eggs was cleared away the next morning by the bleary-eyed staff at the Plaza Hotel in New York City, and the last of the 540 revellers had weaved homeward up Fifth Avenue, not just a party but a way of life had come to a close.Never before had "The Beautiful People" seemed to matter so much, and never would they matter so much again.The growing discontent over the war in Vietnam and the racial tensions simmering just beneath the surface of America's cities were about to take centre stage, turning the haute-coutured denizens of Capote's soirée into so many dress extras from a film they couldn't begin to understand.And while society bandleader Peter Duchin played Irving Berlin tunes and the guests drank their way through more than 500 bottles of vintage Taittinger champagne, there was a younger generation outside rattling the gates, chanting "sex, drugs, rock 'n' roll."When Capote first dreamed of the evening, he had no idea of the repercussions it would eventually have. He never set out to prove that theworld he so desperately wanted to be a part of was empty and meaningless; it just happened that way.In the words of T.S. Eliot, he somehow managed "to do the right deed for the wrong reason."Capote's good friend Slim Keith understood his real motives. "I think it was something a little boy from New Orleans had always dreamed of doing," she told Capote biographer Gerald Clarke. "He wanted to give the biggest and best goddamned party that anybody had ever heard of. He wanted to see every notable in the world absolutely dying to attend a party given by aCandice Bergen funny-looking strange little man — himself."Capote was riding high in the summer of 1966. His "non-fiction novel" In Cold Blood was at the top of the bestseller lists and his name was on the tip of everyone's tongues.His fly-on-the-wall account of how two sociopaths brutally killed a family of four in small-town Kansas, then made their way to the gallows, had earned Capote over $2 million.But even more importantly, it had bought him credibility. The diminutive Southern jester with the voice that sounded like Scarlett O'Hara on nitrous oxide had suddenly fulfilled the promise he'd been flaunting for decades. He was no longer just a witty gadfly with a few magnolia-scented novellas to his credit. He was the real thing now, a writer of substance, with money, power and reputation — the three things New York's elite would always bend a knee to.So it was payback time for Truman, in every sense of the word. He would thank those who had helped him on the way up, he would embrace those whose rarefied world he felt he had now entered, and he would sneer at those who were somewhere below him on the rickety ladder called celebrity.But before the guest list, he would pick a venue.The choice was easy. From the moment it opened its doors in 1907 till the day it shut them in 2005, the Plaza at the ballHotel was the place where Manhattan gathered to celebrate.Alfred Vanderbilt had stayed there on its first night, F. Scott Fitzgerald had burnished it with the gold of his pen to stand as a symbol for "the Lost Generation," and later everyone from Marilyn Monroe to The Beatles had claimed it as their own.No other place would do for Mr. Capote.Once he had booked the Grand Ballroom for Monday night, Nov. 28, he settled on the style. A formal event, of course. But costume? Too campy. Yet he wanted something just a bit out of the ordinary...Masks, of course! Let all the gods and goddesses hide their identity until midnight, and then watch the revels ensue.And it was always good to be a bit stringent in matters of style, so Capote borrowed a page from the "Ascot Gavotte" scene in My Fair Lady and decreed that the colour scheme for the evening would be black and white.Food would be simple. In the wee small hours, there would be the obligatory breakfast buffet, but before that, Capote's sense of wicked whimsy would hold forth.Chicken hash would be served, despite its plebeian origins, because it was Capote's favourite dish at the Plaza's Oak Room Bar. And spaghetti and meatballs would also find their way onto the menu, because — as Capote later devilishly admitted — he wanted to see all those high society ladies trying to avoid getting red sauce on their glistening white gowns.To drink, there would be vintage French champagne, a bottle per person, and Peter Duchin to provide the music.Now, on to the guest list.

`The French Revolution came to mind and our place in the tumbrels'Harold PrinceBroadway producer
For most of the summer, Capote sat by various pools up and down the Eastern seaboard and scribbled names in a simple black-and-white composition book, the kind school children then used.Friends recall seeing him wrapped in thought more intent than that which ever accompanied his creation of a piece of fiction, writing a name in pencil, erasing it violently, smiling wickedly, then adding another name instead.Of course, he would invite his "swans," the rich society women who lunched with him constantly, stroking his ego and feeding him gossip. Babe Paley, Slim Keith, Marella Agnelli — they would all be there.As a guest of honour, to tie the whole thing together, he chose Katharine Graham, president of The Washington Post Company, still dealing with the 1963 suicide of her flamboyant husband, Philip.Having nodded towards the nation's capital with Graham, Capote then decided not to invite President Lyndon Johnson ("He's such a bore!") but did ask his daughter, Lynda Bird ("much more fun"). The Mr. and Mrs. Norman Mailer daughters of former presidents Teddy Roosevelt and Harry Truman made the cut, as did various lords, ladies, barons, baronesses, dukes, duchesses, counts, countesses, a maharaja and a maharani.(The closest thing America had to royalty, Jacqueline Kennedy, the late President Kennedy's widow, was of course invited, but she declined.)For the first time, but not the last, the metaphor of the French Revolution was summoned, as author Leo Lerman commented "the guest book reads like an international list for the guillotine."Storm clouds were gathering, but Capote, busy playing the happy host, either couldn't or wouldn't see them. He whizzed his way through the worlds of industry, politics, academia, fashion and show business, adding names like John Hay Whitney, Leonard Bernstein, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Richard Avedon, Frank Sinatra and Oscar de La Renta.Some people who found themselves off the list threatened suicide, though no one actually followed through on the threat.In this pre-Internet era, it was the various society columnists of the daily New York papers that helped billow the sails of rumour, and they spent September, October and November of that year devoting an almost immoral amount of space to Capote's upcoming event.Every time someone ordered a new gown or switched hairstylists because of the event, it became the occasion for another shrill headline.But other voices began to be heard as well. dance floor Respected political columnist Drew Pearson raised a chill when he wrote that a party funded by the success of In Cold Blood was, in effect, a party funded by the murder of the Clutter family.And designer Cecil Beaton (whose costume-design work on My Fair Lady inspired Capote's black-and-white motif for the evening) went further, invoking the spirits of Perry Smith and Dick Hickock, the murderers who gave Capote so much of the material for his book.Beaton asked, "While the band is blaring and the champagne drunk, who will remember the two murderers but for whose garrulous cooperation the book could not have been written?"
When the night finally arrived, a chill rain was falling, but it didn't stop thousands of people from clustering outside the Plaza.Some were there to gawk at the celebrities, but others had come toPenelope Tree protest an event like this taking place during the year in which Lyndon Johnson had increased the American military personnel in Vietnam from 205,000 to 385,000, with no end in sight.A 19-year-old Candice Bergen remembers being stopped by a reporter who asked her if attending an event like this wasn't inappropriate and hearing someone shout out, "The war's inappropriate."And inside, while some were content to smile as Lauren Bacall and Jerome Robbins glided around the dance floor to "Top Hat," author Norman Mailer and former national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, nearly came to blows discussing the war in Southeast Asia.The next day, the old-school journalists raved about the event, and The New York Times even printed the complete guest list. But Pete Hamill in the New York Post wrote a devastating column in which he alternated a tongue-in-cheek rave over the night's event at the Plaza with Truman at the Ball news reports of the casualties in Vietnam from the previous day.And Hamill wasn't the odd man out. The rest of the cultural world was moving far away from Capote and his ilk.Eight days before the party, Harold Prince's groundbreaking production of Cabaret — which linked the decadence of 1930s Germany with allowing the Nazis to come to power — opened on Broadway. (Prince was a guest at the ball, but he left after only half an hour saying, "The French Revolution came to mind and our place in the tumbrels.")As Capote's guests were arriving at the Plaza, Arthur Penn, Warren Beatty and Faye Dunaway were on location in Texas filming Bonnie and Clyde, the movie that would be released the following summer and make American audiences confront a new face of violence for the first time, one that couldn't be hidden behind the gossamer webs of Capote's prose.And while the New Yorkers who had stayed up all night at the Plaza were sleeping it off on the morning of Nov. 29, George Martin and the Beatles were in their Abbey Road studios, recording "Strawberry Fields Forever," the dense, multi-tracked masterpiece that would stand as a symbol of the new era of complexity in pop music.Seven years later, Capote was to publish a collection of short pieces with the title The Dogs Bark. He claimed his inspiration was the old Arabic proverb, "The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on."What Capote never realized on the night of his Black and White Ball was that the dogs may have been baying loudly at the late November moon, but the caravan had quietly moved on long before.

Tuesday, November 28, 2006

Robert Altman Dies at 81

Director of movies such as Mash, Nashville, The Player, Shortcuts; and Gosford Park, died in
Robert Altman
LosAngeles on Sunday.

Also read:
His biography on all movies
My last post on his last movie The Prairie Home Companion

Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman dies at 94

Thursday, November 16, 2006
By Mark Feeney
Boston Globe Staff

Milton Friedman, the Nobel Prize-winning economist who played a key role in the intellectual resurgence of capitalism and the global shift to free-market economics in the final third of the 20th century, died today at a San Francisco hospital. He was 94. The cause of death was heart

failure.

His death was announced by the Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation, of Indianapolis.

In a 90th-birthday tribute, the columnist George F. Will described Dr. Friedman as �the most consequential public intellectual of the 20th century.�

Few rivaled Dr. Friedman, a self-described �classical liberal,� in the 19th-century sense, in shaping the intellectual climate of the 21st century. A forceful advocate for laissez-faire economics, he provided the theoretical underpinnings for many of the policies put into practice by President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.

Dr. Friedman had resisted the revolution in economics and public policy wrought during the middle third of the last century by the British economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynesianism saw government spending as the key to economic health and viewed a planned economy as the inevitable � and superior � successor to a market economy. (In a nice irony, Dr. Friedman twice submitted articles to an economic journal Keynes edited that were rejected.)

An upholder of the quantity theory of money, Dr. Friedman argued that the money supply mattered more than spending or taxing in influencing the economy. He proclaimed the primacy of the market and argued that it did the most to promote personal freedom.

�Freedom is the major objective in relations among individuals,� Dr. Friedman wrote in ......

Read the article on the Boston Globe also you can read my last post on Dr. Friedman.

Wednesday, November 22, 2006

the next act

THE NEXT ACT
Is a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Issue of 2006-11-27, The New yorker
Posted 2006-11-20

A month before the November elections, Vice-President Dick Cheney was sitting in on a national-security discussion at the Executive Office Building. The talk took a political turn: what if the Democrats won both the Senate and the House? How would that affect policy toward Iran, which is believed to be on the verge of becoming a nuclear power? At that point, according to someone familiar with the discussion, Cheney began reminiscing about his job as a lineman, in the early nineteen-sixties, for a power company in Wyoming. Copper wire was expensive, and the linemen were instructed to return all unused pieces three feet or longer. No one wanted to deal with the paperwork that resulted, Cheney said, so he and his colleagues found a solution: putting “shorteners” on the wire—that is, cutting it into short pieces and tossing the leftovers at the end of the workday. If the Democrats won on November 7th, the Vice-President said, that victory would not stop the Administration from pursuing a military option with Iran. The White House would put “shorteners” on any legislative restrictions, Cheney said, and thus stop Congress from getting in its way.

The White House’s concern was not that the Democrats would cut off funds for the war in Iraq but that future legislation would prohibit it from financing operations targeted at overthrowing or destabilizing the Iranian government, to keep it from getting the bomb. “They’re afraid that Congress is going to vote a binding resolution to stop a hit on Iran, à la Nicaragua in the Contra war,” a former senior intelligence official told me.

In late 1982, Edward P. Boland, a Democratic representative, introduced the first in a series of “Boland amendments,” which limited the Reagan Administration’s ability to support the Contras, who were working to overthrow Nicaragua’s left-wing Sandinista government. The Boland restrictions led White House officials to orchestrate illegal fund-raising activities for the Contras, including the sale of American weapons, via Israel, to Iran. The result was the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-eighties. Cheney’s story, according to the source, was his way of saying that, whatever a Democratic Congress might do next year to limit the President’s authority, the Administration would find a way to work around it. (In response to a request for comment, the Vice-President’s office said that it had no record of the discussion.) more

Saturday, November 11, 2006

Regarding the Torture of Others

By SUSAN SONTAG

I.

For a long time -- at least six decades -- photographs have laid down the tracks of how important conflicts are judged and remembered. The Western memory museum is now mostly a visual one. Photographs have an insuperable power to determine what we recall of events, and it now seems probable that the defining association of people everywhere with the war that the United States launched pre-emptively in Iraq last year will be photographs of the torture of


Iraqi prisoners by Americans in the most infamous of Saddam Hussein's prisons, Abu Ghraib.

The Bush administration and its defenders have chiefly sought to limit a public-relations disaster -- the dissemination of the photographs -- rather than deal with the complex crimes of leadership and of policy revealed by the pictures. There was, first of all, the displacement of the reality onto the photographs themselves. The administration's initial response was to say that the president was shocked and disgusted by the photographs -- as if the fault or horror lay in the images, not in what they depict. There was also the avoidance of the word ''torture.'' The prisoners had possibly been the objects of ''abuse,'' eventually of ''humiliation'' -- that was the most to be admitted. ''My impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different from torture,'' Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said at a press conference. ''And therefore I'm not going to address the 'torture' word.''

Words alter, words add, words subtract. It was the strenuous avoidance of the word ''genocide'' while some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda were being slaughtered, over a few weeks' time, by their Hutu neighbors 10 years ago that indicated the American government had no intention of doing anything. To refuse to call what took place in Abu Ghraib -- and what has taken place elsewhere in Iraq and in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay -- by its true name, torture, is as outrageous as the refusal to call the Rwandan genocide a genocide. Here is one of the definitions of torture contained in a convention to which the United States is a signatory: ''any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.'' (The definition comes from the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Similar definitions have existed for some time in customary law and in treaties, starting with Article 3 -- common to the four Geneva conventions of 1949 -- and many recent human rights conventions.) The 1984 convention declares, ''No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.'' And all covenants on torture specify that it includes treatment intended to humiliate the victim, like leaving prisoners naked in cells and corridors.

Whatever actions this administration undertakes to limit the damage of the widening revelations of the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere -- trials, courts-martial, dishonorable discharges, resignation of senior military figures and responsible administration officials and substantial compensation to the victims -- it is probable that the ''torture'' word will continue to be banned. To acknowledge that Americans torture their prisoners would contradict everything this administration has invited the public to believe about the virtue of American intentions and America's right, flowing from that virtue, to undertake unilateral action on the world stage.

Even when the president was finally compelled, as the damage to America's reputation everywhere in the world widened and deepened, to use the ''sorry'' word, the focus of regret still seemed the damage to America's claim to moral superiority. Yes, President Bush said in Washington on May 6, standing alongside King Abdullah II of Jordan, he was ''sorry for the humiliation suffered by the Iraqi prisoners and the humiliation suffered by their families.'' But, he went on, he was ''equally sorry that people seeing these pictures didn't understand the true nature and heart of America.''

To have the American effort in Iraq summed up by these images must seem, to those who saw some justification in a war that did overthrow one of the monster tyrants of modern times, ''unfair.'' A war, an occupation, is inevitably a huge tapestry of actions. What makes some actions representative and others not? The issue is not whether the torture was done by individuals (i.e., ''not by everybody'') -- but whether it was systematic. Authorized. Condoned. All acts are done by individuals. The issue is not whether a majority or a minority of Americans performs such acts but whether the nature of the policies prosecuted by this administration and the hierarchies deployed to carry them out makes such acts likely.

II.

Considered in this light, the photographs are us. That is, they are representative of the fundamental corruptions of any foreign occupation together with the Bush adminstration's distinctive policies. The Belgians in the Congo, the French in Algeria, practiced torture and sexual humiliation on despised recalcitrant natives. Add to this generic corruption the mystifying, near-total unpreparedness of the American rulers of Iraq to deal with the complex realities of the country after its ''liberation.'' And add to that the overarching, distinctive doctrines of the Bush administration, namely that the United States has embarked on an endless war and that those detained in this war are, if the president so decides, ''unlawful combatants'' -- a policy enunciated by Donald Rumsfeld for Taliban and Qaeda prisoners as early as January 2002 -- and thus, as Rumsfeld said, ''technically'' they ''do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention,'' and you have a perfect recipe for the cruelties and crimes committed against the thousands incarcerated without charges or access to lawyers in American-run prisons that have been set up since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

So, then, is the real issue not the photographs themselves but what the photographs reveal to have happened to ''suspects'' in American custody? No: the horror of what is shown in the photographs cannot be separated from the horror that the photographs were taken -- with the perpetrators posing, gloating, over their helpless captives. German soldiers in the Second World War took photographs of the atrocities they were committing in Poland and Russia, but snapshots in which the executioners placed themselves among their victims are exceedingly rare, as may be seen in a book just published, ''Photographing the Holocaust,'' by Janina Struk. If there is something comparable to what these pictures show it would be some of the photographs of black victims of lynching taken between the 1880's and 1930's, which show Americans grinning beneath the naked mutilated body of a black man or woman hanging behind them from a tree. The lynching photographs were souvenirs of a collective action whose participants felt perfectly justified in what they had done. So are the pictures from Abu Ghraib.

The lynching pictures were in the nature of photographs as trophies -- taken by a photographer in order to be collected, stored in albums, displayed. The pictures taken by American soldiers in Abu Ghraib, however, reflect a shift in the use made of pictures -- less objects to be saved than messages to be disseminated, circulated. A digital camera is a common possession among soldiers. Where once photographing war was the province of photojournalists, now the soldiers themselves are all photographers -- recording their war, their fun, their observations of what they find picturesque, their atrocities -- and swapping images among themselves and e-mailing them around the globe.

There is more and more recording of what people do, by themselves. At least or especially in America, Andy Warhol's ideal of filming real events in real time -- life isn't edited, why should its record be edited? -- has become a norm for countless Webcasts, in which people record their day, each in his or her own reality show. Here I am -- waking and yawning and stretching, brushing my teeth, making breakfast, getting the kids off to school. People record all aspects of their lives, store them in computer files and send the files around. Family life goes with the recording of family life -- even when, or especially when, the family is in the throes of crisis and disgrace. Surely the dedicated, incessant home-videoing of one another, in conversation and monologue, over many years was the most astonishing material in ''Capturing the Friedmans,'' the recent documentary by Andrew Jarecki about a Long Island family embroiled in pedophilia charges.

An erotic life is, for more and more people, that whither can be captured in digital photographs and on video. And perhaps the torture is more attractive, as something to record, when it has a sexual component. It is surely revealing, as more Abu Ghraib photographs enter public view, that torture photographs are interleaved with pornographic images of American soldiers having sex with one another. In fact, most of the torture photographs have a sexual theme, as in those showing the coercing of prisoners to perform, or simulate, sexual acts among themselves. One exception, already canonical, is the photograph of the man made to stand on a box, hooded and sprouting wires, reportedly told he would be electrocuted if he fell off. Yet pictures of prisoners bound in painful positions, or made to stand with outstretched arms, are infrequent. That they count as torture cannot be doubted. You have only to look at the terror on the victim's face, although such ''stress'' fell within the Pentagon's limits of the acceptable. But most of the pictures seem part of a larger confluence of torture and pornography: a young woman leading a naked man around on a leash is classic dominatrix imagery. And you wonder how much of the sexual tortures inflicted on the inmates of Abu Ghraib was inspired by the vast repertory of pornographic imagery available on the Internet -- and which ordinary people, by sending out Webcasts of themselves, try to emulate.

III.

To live is to be photographed, to have a record of one's life, and therefore to go on with one's life oblivious, or claiming to be oblivious, to the camera's nonstop attentions. But to live is also to pose. To act is to share in the community of actions recorded as images. The expression of satisfaction at the acts of torture being inflicted on helpless, trussed, naked victims is only part of the story. There is the deep satisfaction of being photographed, to which one is now more inclined to respond not with a stiff, direct gaze (as in former times) but with glee. The events are in part designed to be photographed. The grin is a grin for the camera. There would be something missing if, after stacking the naked men, you couldn't take a picture of them.

Looking at these photographs, you ask yourself, How can someone grin at the sufferings and humiliation of another human being? Set guard dogs at the genitals and legs of cowering naked prisoners? Force shackled, hooded prisoners to masturbate or simulate oral sex with one another? And you feel naive for asking, since the answer is, self-evidently, People do these things to other people. Rape and pain inflicted on the genitals are among the most common forms of torture. Not just in Nazi concentration camps and in Abu Ghraib when it was run by Saddam Hussein. Americans, too, have done and do them when they are told, or made to feel, that those over whom they have absolute power deserve to be humiliated, tormented. They do them when they are led to believe that the people they are torturing belong to an inferior race or religion. For the meaning of these pictures is not just that these acts were performed, but that their perpetrators apparently had no sense that there was anything wrong in what the pictures show.

Even more appalling, since the pictures were meant to be circulated and seen by many people: it was all fun. And this idea of fun is, alas, more and more -- contrary to what President Bush is telling the world -- part of ''the true nature and heart of America.'' It is hard to measure the increasing acceptance of brutality in American life, but its evidence is everywhere, starting with the video games of killing that are a principal entertainment of boys -- can the video game ''Interrogating the Terrorists'' really be far behind? -- and on to the violence that has become endemic in the group rites of youth on an exuberant kick. Violent crime is down, yet the easy delight taken in violence seems to have grown. From the harsh torments inflicted on incoming students in many American suburban high schools -- depicted in Richard Linklater's 1993 film, ''Dazed and Confused'' -- to the hazing rituals of physical brutality and sexual humiliation in college fraternities and on sports teams, America has become a country in which the fantasies and the practice of violence are seen as good entertainment, fun.

What formerly was segregated as pornography, as the exercise of extreme sadomasochistic longings -- as in Pier Paolo Pasolini's last, near-unwatchable film, ''Salo'' (1975), depicting orgies of torture in the Fascist redoubt in northern Italy at the end of the Mussolini era -- is now being normalized, by some, as high-spirited play or venting. To ''stack naked men'' is like a college fraternity prank, said a caller to Rush Limbaugh and the many millions of Americans who listen to his radio show. Had the caller, one wonders, seen the photographs? No matter. The observation -- or is it the fantasy? -- was on the mark. What may still be capable of shocking some Americans was Limbaugh's response: ''Exactly!'' he exclaimed. ''Exactly my point. This is no different than what happens at the Skull and Bones initiation, and we're going to ruin people's lives over it, and we're going to hamper our military effort, and then we are going to really hammer them because they had a good time.'' ''They'' are the American soldiers, the torturers. And Limbaugh went on: ''You know, these people are being fired at every day. I'm talking about people having a good time, these people. You ever heard of emotional release?''

Shock and awe were what our military promised the Iraqis. And shock and the awful are what these photographs announce to the world that the Americans have delivered: a pattern of criminal behavior in open contempt of international humanitarian conventions. Soldiers now pose, thumbs up, before the atrocities they commit, and send off the pictures to their buddies. Secrets of private life that, formerly, you would have given nearly anything to conceal, you now clamor to be invited on a television show to reveal. What is illustrated by these photographs is as much the culture of shamelessness as the reigning admiration for unapologetic brutality.

IV.

The notion that apologies or professions of ''disgust'' by the president and the secretary of defense are a sufficient response is an insult to one's historical and moral sense. The torture of prisoners is not an aberration. It is a direct consequence of the with-us-or-against-us doctrines of world struggle with which the Bush administration has sought to change, change radically, the international stance of the United States and to recast many domestic institutions and prerogatives. The Bush administration has committed the country to a pseudo-religious doctrine of war, endless war -- for ''the war on terror'' is nothing less than that. Endless war is taken to justify endless incarcerations. Those held in the extralegal American penal empire are ''detainees''; ''prisoners,'' a newly obsolete word, might suggest that they have the rights accorded by international law and the laws of all civilized countries. This endless ''global war on terrorism'' -- into which both the quite justified invasion of Afghanistan and the unwinnable folly in Iraq have been folded by Pentagon decree -- inevitably leads to the demonizing and dehumanizing of anyone declared by the Bush administration to be a possible terrorist: a definition that is not up for debate and is, in fact, usually made in secret.

The charges against most of the people detained in the prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan being nonexistent -- the Red Cross reports that 70 to 90 percent of those being held seem to have committed no crime other than simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time, caught up in some sweep of ''suspects'' -- the principal justification for holding them is ''interrogation.'' Interrogation about what? About anything. Whatever the detainee might know. If interrogation is the point of detaining prisoners indefinitely, then physical coercion, humiliation and torture become inevitable.

Remember: we are not talking about that rarest of cases, the ''ticking time bomb'' situation, which is sometimes used as a limiting case that justifies torture of prisoners who have knowledge of an imminent attack. This is general or nonspecific information-gathering, authorized by American military and civilian administrators to learn more of a shadowy empire of evildoers about whom Americans know virtually nothing, in countries about which they are singularly ignorant: in principle, any information at all might be useful. An interrogation that produced no information (whatever information might consist of) would count as a failure. All the more justification for preparing prisoners to talk. Softening them up, stressing them out -- these are the euphemisms for the bestial practices in American prisons where suspected terrorists are being held. Unfortunately, as Staff Sgt. Ivan (Chip) Frederick noted in his diary, a prisoner can get too stressed out and die. The picture of a man in a body bag with ice on his chest may well be of the man Frederick was describing.

The pictures will not go away. That is the nature of the digital world in which we live. Indeed, it seems they were necessary to get our leaders to acknowledge that they had a problem on their hands. After all, the conclusions of reports compiled by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other reports by journalists and protests by humanitarian organizations about the atrocious punishments inflicted on ''detainees'' and ''suspected terrorists'' in prisons run by the American military, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, have been circulating for more than a year. It seems doubtful that such reports were read by President Bush or Vice President Dick Cheney or Condoleezza Rice or Rumsfeld. Apparently it took the photographs to get their attention, when it became clear they could not be suppressed; it was the photographs that made all this ''real'' to Bush and his associates. Up to then, there had been only words, which are easier to cover up in our age of infinite digital self-reproduction and self-dissemination, and so much easier to forget.

So now the pictures will continue to ''assault'' us -- as many Americans are bound to feel. Will people get used to them? Some Americans are already saying they have seen enough. Not, however, the rest of the world. Endless war: endless stream of photographs. Will editors now debate whether showing more of them, or showing them uncropped (which, with some of the best-known images, like that of a hooded man on a box, gives a different and in some instances more appalling view), would be in ''bad taste'' or too implicitly political? By ''political,'' read: critical of the Bush administration's imperial project. For there can be no doubt that the photographs damage, as Rumsfeld testified, ''the reputation of the honorable men and women of the armed forces who are courageously and responsibly and professionally defending our freedom across the globe.'' This damage -- to our reputation, our image, our success as the lone superpower -- is what the Bush administration principally deplores. How the protection of ''our freedom'' -- the freedom of 5 percent of humanity -- came to require having American soldiers ''across the globe'' is hardly debated by our elected officials.

Already the backlash has begun. Americans are being warned against indulging in an orgy of self-condemnation. The continuing publication of the pictures is being taken by many Americans as suggesting that we do not have the right to defend ourselves: after all, they (the terrorists) started it. They -- Osama bin Laden? Saddam Hussein? what's the difference? -- attacked us first. Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma, a Republican member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, before which Secretary Rumsfeld testified, avowed that he was sure he was not the only member of the committee ''more outraged by the outrage'' over the photographs than by what the photographs show. ''These prisoners,'' Senator Inhofe explained, ''you know they're not there for traffic violations. If they're in Cellblock 1-A or 1-B, these prisoners, they're murderers, they're terrorists, they're insurgents. Many of them probably have American blood on their hands, and here we're so concerned about the treatment of those individuals.'' It's the fault of ''the media'' which are provoking, and will continue to provoke, further violence against Americans around the world. More Americans will die. Because of these photos.

There is an answer to this charge, of course. Americans are dying not because of the photographs but because of what the photographs reveal to be happening, happening with the complicity of a chain of command -- so Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba implied, and Pfc. Lynndie England said, and (among others) Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a Republican, suggested, after he saw the Pentagon's full range of images on May 12. ''Some of it has an elaborate nature to it that makes me very suspicious of whether or not others were directing or encouraging,'' Senator Graham said. Senator Bill Nelson, a Florida Democrat, said that viewing an uncropped version of one photo showing a stack of naked men in a hallway -- a version that revealed how many other soldiers were at the scene, some not even paying attention -- contradicted the Pentagon's assertion that only rogue soldiers were involved. ''Somewhere along the line,'' Senator Nelson said of the torturers, ''they were either told or winked at.'' An attorney for Specialist Charles Graner Jr., who is in the picture, has had his client identify the men in the uncropped version; according to The Wall Street Journal, Graner said that four of the men were military intelligence and one a civilian contractor working with military intelligence.

V.

But the distinction between photograph and reality -- as between spin and policy -- can easily evaporate. And that is what the administration wishes to happen. ''There are a lot more photographs and videos that exist,'' Rumsfeld acknowledged in his testimony. ''If these are released to the public, obviously, it's going to make matters worse.'' Worse for the administration and its programs, presumably, not for those who are the actual -- and potential? -- victims of torture.

The media may self-censor but, as Rumsfeld acknowledged, it's hard to censor soldiers overseas, who don't write letters home, as in the old days, that can be opened by military censors who ink out unacceptable lines. Today's soldiers instead function like tourists, as Rumsfeld put it, ''running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off, against the law, to the media, to our surprise.'' The administration's effort to withhold pictures is proceeding along several fronts. Currently, the argument is taking a legalistic turn: now the photographs are classified as evidence in future criminal cases, whose outcome may be prejudiced if they are made public. The Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Warner of Virginia, after the May 12 slide show of image after image of sexual humiliation and violence against Iraqi prisoners, said he felt ''very strongly'' that the newer photos ''should not be made public. I feel that it could possibly endanger the men and women of the armed forces as they are serving and at great risk.''

But the real push to limit the accessibility of the photographs will come from the continuing effort to protect the administration and cover up our misrule in Iraq -- to identify ''outrage'' over the photographs with a campaign to undermine American military might and the purposes it currently serves. Just as it was regarded by many as an implicit criticism of the war to show on television photographs of American soldiers who have been killed in the course of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, it will increasingly be thought unpatriotic to disseminate the new photographs and further tarnish the image of America.

After all, we're at war. Endless war. And war is hell, more so than any of the people who got us into this rotten war seem to have expected. In our digital hall of mirrors, the pictures aren't going to go away. Yes, it seems that one picture is worth a thousand words. And even if our leaders choose not to look at them, there will be thousands more snapshots and videos. Unstoppable.


Susan Sontag is the author, most recently, of ''Regarding the Pain of Others.''
This article originally appeared in the New York Times.

See previous post on Susan Sontag: Memento Mori

Tuesday, November 7, 2006

a good day for dems, the american people, and the world

this has to be my favorite political ad of 2006. have u had enough? -- vocals by rickie lee jones.

Sunday, November 5, 2006

The European Showerbath -- Peter Greenway 2004


The European Showerbath

With the Visions of Europe project, Lars Von Trier and his Zentropa company came up with the idea of 25 directors from 25 different countries in the European Union making a short film pertaining to Europe, with each film lasting around 5 minutes. Peter Greenaway made the United Kingdom's entry, entitled The European Showerbath. It shows us naked men and women of differing sizes, each with the flag of their country painted on their flesh. The first person who enters the shower is a portly man with a German flag painted on him. Next it's a lady with large breasts with the French flag displayed on her. Other people/countries enter the shower, seeming to follow in an order of importance and influence. Eventually the shower is crowded, and the small countries stand on the outside looking in. Then the shower stops. It's too late for them. The music by Architorti compliments.



"Fifteen countries of Europe, brightly identified with their national flags body-painted on their vulnerable naked flesh, and personified in their political economic history by older or younger, fatter or thinner corporeality, step one by one, optimistically into the warm showerbath of the European Community. First the original six; sturdy if plump-bellied Germany, voluptuous if a little over-extrovert France, young introspective Belgium, confident if a little vain Luxembourg, self-effacing Holland and elderly if a little frivolous Italy, followed, in order of membership by the remaining nine, each with their own physical identities, making up a community self-revealing in their camaraderie, all trying to maximise their position in the European warm water community, shoving a little, flirting a little, laughing and joking, if a little self-consciously, exuberantly demonstrating their togetherness a little too over-eagerly, enjoying mutual, frank, self-exposing, self-revelation, all dipping their heads and limbs and exposed bodies into the limited water-shower of benefits.
Waiting in the wings, are further optimistic entrants, ready to reveal their nakedness, eager to strip off their protective clothes…" - Description from the Visions of Europe site press book

Friday, November 3, 2006

Paris photo 2006

Previw Picks from Lens Culture
Our Preview Picks

16-19 November 2006
Carousel du Louvre, Paris

For many lovers of photography, Paris Photo represents the best excuse to spend a week in one of the most beautiful cities in the world, soaking up the wonderful — new and old — in the world of photography.

This is truly an international event, bringing together collectors, photographers, galleries and publishers from all over the globe to participate in this sometimes overwhelming exposition and lively marketplace. This year 106 exhibitors from 21 different countries will be showing the work of over 500 photogaphers.

This year, special emphasis will be on photography from the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

Here, in no particular order, are 86 of our top-picks from the preview showing. It looks to be a great year.

All photos courtesy of Paris Photo 2006.

Cheers!


Tuesday, October 24, 2006

The Next War

By Daniel Ellsberg.

10/22/06 "
Harpers" -- -- A hidden crisis is under way. Many government insiders are aware of serious plans for war with Iran, but Congress and the public remain largely in the dark. The current situation is very like that of 1964, the year preceding our overt, open-ended escalation of the Vietnam War, and 2002, the year leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

In both cases, if one or more conscientious insiders had closed the information gap with unauthorized disclosures to the public, a disastrous war might have been averted entirely.

My own failure to act, in time, to that effect in 1964 was pointed out to me by Wayne Morse thirty-five years ago. Morse had been one of only two U.S. senators to vote against the Tonkin

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Gulf resolution on August 7, 1964. He had believed, correctly, that President Lyndon Johnson would treat the resolution as a congressional declaration of war. His colleagues, however, accepted White House assurances that the president sought “no wider war” and had no intention of expanding hostilities without further consulting them. They believed that they were simply expressing bipartisan support for U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam three days earlier, which the president and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had told them were in “retaliation” for the “unequivocal,” “unprovoked” attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on U.S. destroyers “on routine patrol” in “international waters.”

Each of the assurances above had been false, a conscious lie. That they were lies, though, had only been revealed to the public seven years later with the publication of the Pentagon Papers, several thousand pages of top-secret documents on U.S. decision-making in Vietnam that I had released to the press. The very first installment, published by the New York Times on June 13, 1971, had proven the official account of the Tonkin Gulf episode to be a deliberate deception.

When we met in September, Morse had just heard me mention to an audience that all of that evidence of fraud had been in my own Pentagon safe at the time of the Tonkin Gulf vote. (By coincidence, I had started work as a special assistant to an assistant secretary of defense the day of the alleged attack—which had not, in fact, occurred at all.) After my talk, Morse, who had been a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1964, said to me, “If you had given those documents to me at the time, the Tonkin Gulf resolution would never have gotten out of committee. And if it had somehow been brought up on the floor of the Senate for a vote, it would never have passed.”

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He was telling me, it seemed, that it had been in my power, seven years earlier, to avert the deaths so far of 50,000 Americans and millions of Vietnamese, with many more to come. It was not something I was eager to hear. After all, I had just been indicted on what eventually were twelve federal felony counts, with a possible sentence of 115 years in prison, for releasing the Pentagon Papers to the public. I had consciously accepted that prospect in some small hope of shortening the war. Morse was saying that I had missed a real opportunity to prevent the war altogether.

My first reaction was that Morse had overestimated the significance of the Tonkin Gulf resolution and, therefore, the alleged consequences of my not blocking it in August. After all, I felt, Johnson would have found another occasion to get such a resolution passed, or gone ahead without one, even if someone had exposed the fraud in early August.

Years later, though, the thought hit me: What if I had told Congress and the public, later in the fall of 1964, the whole truth about what was coming, with all the documents I had acquired in my job by September, October, or November? Not just, as Morse had suggested, the contents of a few files on the events surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident—all that I had in early August—but the drawerfuls of critical working papers, memos, estimates, and detailed escalation options revealing the evolving plans of the Johnson Administration for a wider war, expected to commence soon after the election. In short, what if I had put out before the end of the year, whether before or after the November election, all of the classified papers from that period that I did eventually disclose in 1971?

Had I done so, the public and Congress would have learned that Johnson’s campaign theme, “we seek no wider war,” was a hoax. They would have learned, in fact, that the Johnson Administration had been heading in secret toward essentially the same policy of expanded war that his presidential rival, Senator Barry Goldwater, openly advocated—a policy that the voters overwhelmingly repudiated at the polls.

I would have been indicted then, as I was seven years later, and probably imprisoned. But America would have been at peace during those years. It was only with that reflection, perhaps a decade after the carnage finally ended, that I recognized Morse had been right about my personal share of responsibility for the whole war.

Not just mine alone. Any one of a hundred officials—some of whom foresaw the whole catastrophe—could have told the hidden truth to Congress, with documents. Instead, our silence made us all accomplices in the ensuing slaughter.

* * *

The run-up to the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution was almost exactly parallel to the run-up to the 2002 Iraq war resolution.

In both cases, the president and his top Cabinet officers consciously deceived Congress and the public about a supposed short-run threat in order to justify and win support for carrying out preexisting offensive plans against a country that was not a near-term danger to the United States. In both cases, the deception was essential to the political feasibility of the program precisely because expert opinion inside the government foresaw costs, dangers, and low prospects of success that would have doomed the project politically if there had been truly informed public discussion beforehand. And in both cases, that necessary deception could not have succeeded without the obedient silence of hundreds of insiders who knew full well both the deception and the folly of acting upon it.

One insider aware of the Iraq plans, and knowledgeable about the inevitably disastrous result of executing those plans, was Richard Clarke, chief of counterterrorism for George W. Bush and adviser to three presidents before him. He had spent September 11, 2001, in the White House, coordinating the nation’s response to the attacks. He reports in his memoir, Against All Enemies, discovering the next morning, to his amazement, that most discussions there were about attacking Iraq.

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Clarke told Bush and Rumsfeld that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, or with its perpetrator, Al Qaeda. As Clarke said to Secretary of State Colin Powell that afternoon, “Having been attacked by al Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response”—which Rumsfeld was already urging—“would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.”

Actually, Clarke foresaw that it would be much worse than that. Attacking Iraq not only would be a crippling distraction from the task of pursuing the real enemy but would in fact aid that enemy: “Nothing America could have done would have provided al Qaeda and its new generation of cloned groups a better recruitment device than our unprovoked invasion of an oil-rich Arab country.”

I single out Clarke—by all accounts among the best of the best of public servants—only because of his unique role in counterterrorism and because, thanks to his illuminating 2004 memoir, we know his thoughts at that time, and, in particular, the intensity of his anguish and frustration. Such a memoir allows us, as we read each new revelation, to ask a simple question: What difference might it have made to events if he had told us this at the time?

Clarke was not, of course, the only one who could have told us, or told Congress. We know from other accounts that both of his key judgments—the absence of linkage between Al Qaeda and Saddam and his correct prediction that “attacking Iraq would actually make America less secure and strengthen the broader radical Islamic terrorist movement”—were shared by many professionals in the CIA, the State Department, and the military.

Yet neither of these crucial, expert conclusions was made available to Congress or the public, by Clarke or anyone else, in the eighteen-month run-up to the war. Even as they heard the president lead the country to the opposite, false impressions, toward what these officials saw as a disastrous, unjustified war, they felt obliged to keep their silence.

Costly as their silence was to their country and its victims, I feel I know their mind-set. I had long prized my own identity as a keeper of the president’s secrets. In 1964 it never even occurred to me to break the many secrecy agreements I had signed, in the Marines, at the Rand Corporation, in the Pentagon. Although I already knew the Vietnam War was a mistake and based on lies, my loyalties then were to the secretary of defense and the president (and to my promises of secrecy, on which my own career as a president’s man depended). I’m not proud that it took me years of war to awaken to the higher loyalties owed by every government official to the rule of law, to our soldiers in harm’s way, to our fellow citizens, and, explicitly, to the Constitution, which every one of us had sworn an oath “to support and uphold.”

It took me that long to recognize that the secrecy agreements we had signed frequently conflicted with our oath to uphold the Constitution. That conflict arose almost daily, unnoticed by me or other officials, whenever we were secretly aware that the president or other executive officers were lying to or misleading Congress. In giving priority, in effect, to my promise of secrecy—ignoring my constitutional obligation—I was no worse or better than any of my Vietnam-era colleagues, or those who later saw the Iraq war approaching and failed to warn anyone outside the executive branch.

Ironically, Clarke told Vanity Fair in 2004 that in his own youth he had ardently protested “the complete folly” of the Vietnam War and that he “wanted to get involved in national security in 1973 as a career so that Vietnam didn’t happen again.” He is left today with a sense of failure:

It’s an arrogant thing to think, Could I have ever stopped another Vietnam? But it really filled me with frustration that when I saw Iraq coming I wasn’t able to do anything. After having spent thirty years in national security and having been in some senior-level positions you would think that I might be able to have some influence, some tiny influence. But I couldn’t have any.
But it was not too arrogant, I believe, for Clarke to aspire to stop this second Vietnam personally. He actually had a good chance to do so, throughout 2002, the same one Senator Morse had pointed out to me.

Instead of writing a memoir to be cleared for publication in 2004, a year after Iraq had been invaded, Clarke could have made his knowledge of the war to come, and its danger to our security, public before the war. He could have supported his testimony with hundreds of files of documents from his office safe and computer, to which he then still had access. He could have given these to both the media and the then Democratic-controlled Senate.

“If I had criticized the president to the press as a special assistant” in the summer of 2002, Clarke told Larry King in March 2004, “I would have been fired within an hour.” That is undoubtedly true. But should that be the last word on that course? To be sure, virtually all bureaucrats would agree with him, as he told King, that his

only responsible options at that point were either to resign quietly or to “spin” for the White House to the press, as he did. But that is just the working norm I mean to question here.

His unperceived alternative, I wish to suggest, was precisely to court being fired for telling the truth to the public, with documentary evidence, in the summer of 2002. For doing that, Clarke would not only have lost his job, his clearance, and his career as an executive official; he would almost surely have been prosecuted, and he might have gone to prison. But the controversy that ensued would not have been about hindsight and blame. It would have been about whether war on Iraq would make the United States safer, and whether it was otherwise justified.

That debate did not occur in 2002—just as a real debate about war in Vietnam did not occur in 1964—thanks to the disciplined reticence of Clarke and many others. Whatever his personal fate, which might have been severe, his disclosures would have come before the war. Perhaps, instead of it.

* * *

http://www.aeronautics.ru/img/img006/shafagh_iran_003.jpg

Shafagh Fighter

We face today a crisis similar to those of 1964 and 2002, a crisis hidden once again from the public and most of Congress. Articles by Seymour Hersh and others have revealed that, as in both those earlier cases, the president has secretly directed the completion, though not yet execution, of military operational plans—not merely hypothetical “contingency plans” but constantly updated plans, with movement of forces and high states of readiness, for prompt implementation on command—for attacking a country that, unless attacked itself, poses no threat to the United States: in this case, Iran.

According to these reports, many high-level officers and government officials are convinced that our president will attempt to bring about regime change in Iran by air attack; that he and his vice president have long been no less committed, secretly, to doing so than they were to attacking Iraq; and that his secretary of defense is as madly optimistic about the prospects for fast, cheap military success there as he was in Iraq.

Even more ominously, Philip Giraldi, a former CIA official, reported in The American Conservative a year ago that Vice President Cheney’s office had directed contingency planning for “a large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons” and that “several senior Air Force officers” involved in the planning were “appalled at the implications of what they are doing—that Iran is being set up for an unprovoked nuclear attack—but no one is prepared to damage his career by posing any objection.”

Several of Hersh’s sources have confirmed both the detailed operational planning for use of nuclear weapons against deep underground Iranian installations and military resistance to this prospect, which led several senior officials to consider resigning. Hersh notes that opposition by the Joint Chiefs in April led to White House withdrawal of the “nuclear option”—for now, I would say. The operational plans remain in existence, to be drawn upon for a “decisive” blow if the president deems it necessary.

Many of these sources regard the planned massive air attack—with or without nuclear weapons—as almost sure to be catastrophic for the Middle East, the position of the United States in the world, our troops in Iraq, the world economy, and U.S. domestic security. Thus they are as deeply concerned about these prospects as many other insiders were in the year before the Iraq invasion. That is why, unlike in the lead-up to Vietnam or Iraq, some insiders are leaking to reporters. But since these disclosures—so far without documents and without attribution—have not evidently had enough credibility to raise public alarm, the question is whether such officials have yet reached the limit of their responsibilities to our country.

Assuming Hersh’s so-far anonymous sources mean what they say—that this is, as one puts it, “a juggernaut that has to be stopped”—I believe it is time for one or more of them to go beyond fragmentary leaks unaccompanied by documents. That means doing what no other active official or consultant has ever done in a timely way: what neither Richard Clarke nor I nor anyone else thought of doing until we were no longer officials, no longer had access to current documents, after bombs had fallen and thousands had died, years into a war. It means going outside executive channels, as officials with contemporary access, to expose the president’s lies and oppose his war policy publicly before the war, with unequivocal evidence from inside.

Simply resigning in silence does not meet moral or political responsibilities of officials rightly “appalled” by the thrust of secret policy. I hope that one or more such persons will make the sober decision—accepting sacrifice of clearance and career, and risk of prison—to disclose comprehensive files that convey, irrefutably, official, secret estimates of costs and prospects and dangers of the military plans being considered. What needs disclosure is the full internal controversy, the secret critiques as well as the arguments and claims of advocates of war and nuclear “options”—the Pentagon Papers of the Middle East. But unlike in 1971, the ongoing secret debate should be made available before our war in the region expands to include Iran, before the sixty-one-year moratorium on nuclear war is ended violently, to give our democracy a chance to foreclose either of those catastrophes.

The personal risks of doing this are very great. Yet they are not as great as the risks of bodies and lives we are asking daily of over 130,000 young Americans—with many yet to join them—in an unjust war. Our country has urgent need for comparable courage, moral and civil courage, from its public servants. They owe us the truth before the next war begins.

This is The Next War, originally from October 2006, published Thursday, October 19, 2006. It is part of Features, which is part of Harpers.org.

Sunday, October 22, 2006

so, what of it....

So, what of fall? And what of migrating birds overhead, flying, running away from death while we fall behind. What of the many-winged flutter and mutter of people around us? And of seeing all of nature (other than us) moving hurriedly into unexistancehood?
I stand in the struggling-flowing rot of the city. I don’t know enough about the rot to speak of it conclusively so far, other than it’s worst in the Fall.


So, what of a notebook breaking down – and I finding myself crazily -- and on a quietly flowing midnight – in the strangest (yet vaguely familiar in a distant sort of way) of all places: Staring at a white and demanding piece of paper as my fingers lazily rotate a pen between them. I look at my fingers – not recognizing them and I ask:


“does this moment have motiony walls?”
“is this a real moment?”

The exquisite flutter of present tense….the now….the real: “I suddenly realize: it’s the real that is spread in front of me”. The present tense with a real pen and a real crisp-woody-whitish piece of paper, and real loneliness . The present tense is where I find myself.......and to my surprise it’s the only place where life is. So, this one time, this one night, without links or pictures – no information – no constant connectivity – no tags no comments – no unmet-imagined friends – no tempting fires behind the glass that always dance but never burn – so what of it if this one time, this one night, I live in the now, I live in the real?

Saturday, October 14, 2006

Jean-Michel Basquiat ( 1960 - 1988 )

From Neo-Expressionisn to Post-Coloniality


Primary source for below biography:
Sirmans, M. Franklin. "Chronology." Jean-Michel Basquiat. Ed. Richard Marshall. New York: Whitney/Abrams, 1992. 233-250.

Jean-Michel Basquiat was born on December 22, 1960 in Brooklyn, New York. His father, Gerard Basquiat was born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti and hismother, Matilde was born in Brooklyn of Puerto Rican parents. Early on, Basquiat displayed a proficiency in art which was encouraged by his mother. In 1977, Basquiat, along with friend Al Diaz begins spray painting cryptic aphorisms on subway trains and around lower Manhattan and signing them with the name SAMO© as an end to mindwash religion, nowhere politics, and bogus philosophy," "SAMO© saves idiots," "Plush safe he think; SAMO© ." (Same Old Shit). "SAMO©.

In 1978 Basquiat left home for good and quit school just one year before graduating form high school. He lived with friends and began selling hand painted postcards and T-shirts. In June of 1980, Basquiat's artwas publicly exhibited for the first time in a show sponsored by Colab (Collaborative Projects Incorporated) along with the work of Jenny Holzer, Lee Quinones, Kenny Scharf, Kiki Smith, Robin Winters, John Ahearn, Jane Dickson, Mike Glier, Mimi Gross, and David Hammons. Basquiat continued to exhibit his work around New York City and in Europe, participating in shows along with the likes of Keith Haring, Barbara Kruger.

In December of 1981, poet and artist Rene Ricard published the first major article on Basquiat entitled "The Radiant Child" in Artforum. In 1982, Basquiat was featured in the group show "Transavanguardia: Italia/America" alongside Julian Schnabel, David Salle, Francesco Clemente and Enzo Cucchi, thus becoming part of a loose-knit group that art-writers, curators, and collectors would soon be calling the Neo-expressionist movement. He started dating an aspiring performer named Madonna -- Julian Schnabel (went on to direct the biographical film Basquiat in 1996). In 1983 Basquiat had one-artist exhibitions at the galleries of Annina Nosei and Larry Gagosian and was also included in the "1983 Biennial Exhibition" at the Whitney Museum of American Art. It was also in 1983 that Basquiat was befriended by Andy Warhol, a relationship which sparked discussion concerning white patronization of black art, a conflict which remains, to this day, at the center of most discussions of Basquiat's life and work. Basquiat and Warhol collaborated on a number of paintings, none of which are are critically acclaimed. Their relationship continued, despite this, until Warhol's death in 1987.

By 1984, many of Basquiat's friends had become quite concerned about his excessive drug use, often finding him unkempt and in a state of paranoia. Basquiat's paranoia was also fueled by the very real threat of people stealing work from his apartment and of art dealers taking unfinished work from his studio. On February 10, 1985, Basquiat appeared on the cover of The New York Times Magazine, posing for the Cathleen McGuigan article "New Art, New Money: The Marketing of an American Artist." In March , Basquiat had his second one-artist show at the Mary Boone Gallery. In the exhibition catalogue, Robert Farris Thompson spoke of Basquiat's work in terms of an Afro-Atlantic tradition, a context in which this art had never been discussed.

In 1986, Basquiat travelled to Africa for the first time and his work was shown in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. In November, a large exhibition of more than sixty paintings and drawings opened at the Kestner-Gesellschaft in Hannover; at twenty-five Basquiat was the youngest artist ever given an exhibition there. In 1988, Basquiat had shows in both Paris and New York; the New York show was praised by some critics, an encouraging development. Basquiat attempted to kick his heroin addiction by leaving the temptations of New York for his ranch in Hawaii. He returned to New York in June claiming to be drug-free. On August 12 , Basquiat died as the result of a heroin overdose. He was 27.

thanks to nader