Wednesday, June 21, 2006

Professor JK Galbraith (1908 - 2006)


John Kenneth Galbraith was perhaps Canada's most well-known intellectual export, known for both his regular puncturing of established orthodox economic wisdom and the wit with which his attacks are delivered.
The publication of his books The Affluent Society, The New Industrial State, and Economics and the Public Purpose virtually established a Galbraithian school of thought in the United States. Many of Galbraith's ideas on the workings of the corporate sector were incorporated into the post-Keynesian theory that was emerging on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1960s and the 1970s.

He was a Keynesian and an institutionalist, a leading proponent of US-style 20th century political liberalism and progressive politics. His books on economic topics were bestsellers in the late 1950s and during the 1960s.
Galbraith was a prolific author, producing four dozen books and over a thousand articles on various subjects. He taught at Harvard University for many years. Galbraith was also active in politics, serving in the administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson; and among other roles served as U.S. ambassador to India under Kennedy.
He was one of the few two-time recipients of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, receiving one from President Truman in 1946 and another from President Bill Clinton in 2000[1]. He was also awarded the Padma Vibhushan, India's second highest civilian award, for his contributions to strengthening ties between India and the United States.

The following is one of his last interviews :
By Rupert Cornwell in Cambridge, Massachusetts
From The Independent, 01 July 2002

This surely is the hour of John Kenneth Galbraith, grand old man of American economics. But those who travel to the leafy suburbs of Boston in the expectation of a giant and gloating "I told you so" will come away disappointed.
Amid the debris of Enron and WorldCom, the lifelong critic of unbridled corporate power exhibits none of the satisfaction of a prophet whose warnings have come to pass.
"Those of us who've concerned themselves with this matter cannot take satisfaction for discovering that we were at least partly right. That's too much like seeing a Colorado forest fire and knowing there was inadequate protection." The size, too, of the problem has astonished him.
Galbraith is 93 now, close to the end of one of the more remarkable American lives of the 20th century, in which he has been professor, author, ambassador, adviser of Democratic presidents from Roosevelt to Johnson and perhaps the most famous left-wing economist of his age.
These days, frail health forces him to receive visitors in an upstairs room in his rambling, wood-panelled house on a side street behind the Harvard University campus. On a sun-dappled summer afternoon, this Cambridge in North America reminds you irresistibly of north Oxford in England, with its quiet streets and shady gardens. But if the body is frail, the mind is as sharp has ever. Indeed, he has just finished a book dealing, among other things, with corporate fraud.
For his influence and his fame Galbraith never won a Nobel prize – perhaps because he writes too clearly and too elegantly in a field where impenetrability has a habit of being confused with genius. Even John Maynard Keynes, at whose knee Galbraith went to the English Cambridge to study in the 1930s, has not been spared his pupil's tongue. Galbraith once criticised the "unique unreadability" of the General Theory, noting acidly that "as Messiahs go, Keynes was deeply dependent on his prophets". But for all his historical perspective, Galbraith is reluctant to rank this crisis in comparison with other watersheds of American capitalism: the depredations of the robber barons and the ensuing anti-trust legislation, the stock market crash of 1929 and the excesses of the 1980s (in retrospect a trailer perhaps of the even greater follies of the 1990s).
"We can't say how serious this is yet, and anyone who makes such a prediction is suspect," he says, eschewing the giant soundbite dangling in front of him. "I can only say I hadn't expected to see this problem on anything like the magnitude of the last few months – the separation of ownership from management, the monopolisation of control by irresponsible personal money-makers." Time and again as we talk, the author of American Capitalism and of The New Industrial State, the chronicler of The Affluent Society, returns to the same two points. His first is that the large modern corporation, as manipulated by what he calls the "financial craftsmen" at Enron and elsewhere, has grown so complex that it is now almost beyond monitoring.
Second, and consequently, these new entities "have grown out of effective control by the owners, the stockholders, into nearly absolute control by the management and the individuals recruited by management". And in the process, he insists, this latter group has "set its own compensation, either in the form of salaries which can get to fantastic levels, or of stock options".
Such was their power that until they carried their behaviour to extremes and the companies collapsed, "there was almost no criticism from the shareholders – the owners". Galbraith detects something of the conspiracy of silence he recounted so memorably in his book The Great Crash: 1929, first published in 1955 but as readable today as it was then. "They remained very quiet," he wrote of the financial luminaries of that era. "The sense of responsibility in the financial community for the community as a whole is not small. It is nearly nil. To speak out against madness may be to ruin those who have succumbed to it. So the wise on Wall Street are nearly always silent. The foolish have the field to themselves and none rebukes them."
And so it has been today, just as 73 years ago. "There's still a tradition, a culture of restraint," he says, "that keeps one from attacking one's colleagues, one's co-workers, no matter how wrong they seem to be." Amid the current wreckage, this unrivalled student of American business through the ages can identify few crumbs of comfort. One perhaps is that 21st-century-style corporate "larceny" has by and large not infected older established companies. Another is that if Enron and the rest were bad, the accounting industry was worse still.
Galbraith still produces aphorisms to die for, including what may become the epitaph of this age of feckless book-keeping: "Recessions catch what the auditors miss." But behind the quip lie genuine shock and anger. "I've been tracking this matter for a lifetime, and my greatest surprise was the sheer scale of the inadequacy of the accounting profession and some of its most prominent members. I've been looking at auditors' signatures all my life, but I will never again do so without some doubts as to their validity. There must be the strongest public and legal pressure to get honest competent accounting." However belatedly, Galbraith believes that may happen. Indeed, the whole philosophy with which he is identified, of corporate regulation and greater public control of the private sector, may be edging back in favour, two decades after it went out of fashion under Ronald Reagan.
"One of the vocal critics of corporate behaviour," he notes with a wry smile, "has been none other than George Bush. There's no doubt these scandals have altered the mood of the country, and altered the notion that there can be no interference with the free enterprise system. There'll be a search for ways in which the management can be made more responsible, both to shareholders/owners and to the community at large." Steps must be taken, says Galbraith, so that boards of directors, supine and silent for so long, "are clearly the representatives of stockholders' interests, and are competent to exercise that responsibility". Much of this will feature in his new book entitled, rather bafflingly, The Economics of Innocent Fraud, due to be published next year.
Talking to Galbraith, you realise that the "innocent fraud" embraces the entire economic system, no less – a system in which, in many respects, "belief has no necessary relation to reality". Almost everyone, economists included, is unwittingly accomplice to the fraud. One comforting delusion, says Galbraith, Keynesian to the core, is that the central bank can control the economy simply by tweaking interest rates.
"Nothing is more agreeable and reassuring than that the Federal Reserve System and the excellent Alan Greenspan can guide and stabilise the economy by small changes in interest rates. We've hoped and dreamt of this since 1913 [the year the Fed was set up up by President Woodrow Wilson], but it hasn't worked in any predictable way." Instead Galbraith cites the Second World War and the years when he was at the heart of policy-making, running the Office of Price Administration, surely the most interventionist agency in the history of US economic policy-making. The Fed was to all intents and purposes set aside for the duration of the war as the government, not the market, set price levels. Business loathed the OPA, but it worked.
"We came through that period of great expenditure and disaster with no memory of inflation." If the Fed's role is one false assumption, another – now so shockingly exposed – is that corporations always tell the truth. Even the name of the game is a deception, Galbraith argues. "It's no longer called 'capitalism'. That has an inconvenient history. Now it's known as 'the market system', supposedly controlled by consumers – but in a world where the greatest intellectual and artistic talent goes into the management of consumers." Recent events have forced some rewriting of the book, but Galbraith is now confident he has the emphasis right.
Capitalism, though, is nothing if not adaptable. It has to be, with so much riding on the system for almost everyone. In the course of his life, Galbraith has seen America go full circle, from the harsh neglect of the Depression to the New Deal and now back – to some extent at least – to the ruthless ways of the past. "The national mood is less fair today," he says. "We are far more tolerant of a large takeover of revenue by the rich." On the other hand, "the conscience of the community has improved greatly.
"That was the achievement of Roosevelt and the New Deal. Public attitudes were never quite the same again." But then Galbraith leapfrogs 70 years and a dozen presidencies to the massive Bush tax cuts of 2001 to reinforce his point that nothing very much has changed. "It is still politically safe to be very rich," he says, citing what he calls the "imaginative developments" of the Bush administration as a prime example.
"Assuming they will not be in power indefinitely, they are taking the interesting step of enacting tax legislation not for the immediate future but for all of a decade hence. We not only legislate for the affluent, we do it for their permanent advantage." And suddenly, once more, the impish delight of the phrasemaker bursts through. "How's that?" he asks with the sly chuckle of an iconoclast 93 years young.

Tuesday, June 20, 2006

Latin America’s eroding democracy


1 - 6 - 2006 -- Open Democracy


The real Latin America story in 2006 is not of a revived, solidaristic left but of a resurgent, divisive populism that is corroding public life, reports Celia Szusterman in Argentina.

The fashionable current narrative of a "swing to the left" in Latin America, espoused by commentators of left and right alike, appears to have a lot of evidence to commend it: the election of centre-left governments in Brazil and Chile, of more radical figures in Venezuela and Bolivia, and the wave of social protests and convulsions in countries as different as Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico in the first years of the 21st century.
The narrative, however, is only skin-deep. It overlooks a key factor: the populist, nationalist and authoritarian currents that have resurfaced in many places. A full account of this factor reveals that the deeper Latin America story is not a renascent left........ but a populist resurgence that is further eroding already damaged political institutions.
Celia Szusterman is senior lecturer in Spanish and Latin American studies at the University of Westminster and an associate fellow at Chatham House
Also by Celia Szusterman in openDemocracy:
"Argentina: the state we’re in" (October 2005)
An extract from this article:
"After twenty-two years of democratic rule, the quality of democracy and of citizens’ rights in Argentina shows worrying deficits. The Peronist political culture and its exercise of power has exacerbated the worst characteristics of a hyper-presidentialist system. The president's own mode of rule – labelled "style K" – has not contributed to strengthening Argentina’s weak institutions.
"Style K" is not pretty. Kirchner prefers confrontation over negotiation; employs bully-boy tactics when dealing with the opposition, his own minsters, the press or foreign businessmen; refuses to hold cabinet meetings or give press interviews or conferences; and rules by decree rather than with congress. All this can be interpreted as revealing an ignorance of civic culture at best, or a lurking authoritarianism at worst. After all, both were key features of Peronism at its inception.
The result is the insidious propagation of a culture of fear."
A democracy in trouble
A clear indication of this more fundamental trend is apparent in a comparison of the qualitative performance of institutions of governance across the region. Chile and Uruguay have historically been top of this particular league, followed (at some distance) by Brazil; at the bottom are Venezuela and Bolivia, perhaps soon to be followed by Peru; somewhere in the middle, but with strong indications of a downward movement, is Argentina.
The governments of Chile and Uruguay (and a Brazil moving in their direction) can be readily understood as social-democratic polities, administering to a society at least aspiring to some of the classic features of a democratic order: a shared political culture where the rule of law, and established institutions and freedoms are respected, and a society where equality of citizenship and inclusion is guaranteed.
It is more difficult to define the societies, political cultures and institutions of the countries at the bottom of the league. A historical perspective helps to identify the roots of such divergence: longstanding democratic traditions (albeit interrupted by military intervention) in the countries at the top, enduring populist and nationalist traditions in those at the bottom.
In this context, Argentina is doubly unfortunate: both populist and Peronist. It must be recalled that the periods of a truly liberal and democratic republic in Argentina lasted not more than a total of twelve years until the restoration of democracy in 1983 after seven years of military dictatorship. However, since 2002, the regression and involution has been relentless.
Why is Argentina's democracy in trouble? Part of the problem is that the fate of "democracy" (whether in its social, liberal and republican definition) is in the hands of those who neither care for nor understand the importance of the core institutions of democracy: the rule of law, separation of powers (including, crucially, an independent judiciary), accountability of government, freedom of the press, and a culture of compromise and tolerance. These are dismissed by Peronists and populists alike (the categories of course overlap) as "rightwing concerns": not what "the people" need or demand, but what "the enemies of the people" use to conceal their evil intentions.
The impressive economic growth which has enabled Argentina to recover from its virtual collapse in December 2001 cannot disguise that a sort of "decadent" or "low-intensity" democracy has taken hold under its president, Néstor Kirchner.
Kirchner celebrated three years in power on 25 May 2006 at a mass rally in Buenos Aires which was widely seen as a marker for his re-election campaign in 2007. True to the definition of the post-1945 populist leader Juan Perón himself, Kirchner conceives politics as "the art of leading men". Yet this "art" is conceived in military and authoritarian rather than democratic or relational terms: it is all about the personification of power, strict discipline and obedience to the "leader", accumulation of power and hegemonic dominance.
Ricardo Lagos, the predecessor of Michelle Bachelet as Chile's president, said that "populism cannot survive without a fiscal surplus". The proliferation of funds distributed by executive fiat as a means of patronage – bypassing legislative accountability – is just one instance of the lack of transparency of Kirchner's administration. There are others: from the breach of campaign-funding rules to the appointment of piquetero leaders who burned down a police station to government positions.
The co-optation of the radical, strike-leading, factory-occupying piqueteros into the government might be rationalised as part of a strategy to involve them in non-violent democratic politics. In practice it is rather a surrender to intimidation. The same mentality is seen in the politicisation of judicial appointments, which erodes the principle of pluralism and effective checks and balances in the public realm (Human Rights Watch sent a letter to President Kirchner in February 2006 expressing its concern at his "reforms" in this area).
Meanwhile, Argentina's congress is virtually inactive, and where it does meet it pays remarkable inattention to the country's 1994 constitution. This document stipulates that the chief of cabinet should report to congress at least once a month; he has done so on only seven occasions since May 2003, and just once in the whole of 2005. Legislators frequently invoke the phrase "awaiting presidential orders" before attempting even to initiate a debate.
The congressional revision of more than 1,000 laws and executive decrees, overdue since 1999, has not started. The body's committee for constitutional affairs – chaired by Cristina Kirchner, the president's spouse and a considerable, ambitious figure in her own right – has taken no steps to begin the process. These laws will lapse in August 2006, throwing the country into legal chaos – unless the revision is postponed yet again.
Argentina's public life is subject to an array of authoritarian measures. The respected, independent Association for Civil Rights highlights attempts at press manipulation and intimidation; these include indirect as well as direct pressures, such as the efforts of public officials close to Kirchner to persuade private companies to withdraw advertising from critical and independent media.
A region against itself
Political culture is difficult to define: yet much of what is going on in Argentina can only be understood against a background of violent, fractious confrontation between groups divided not by ideological or programmatic identities but by a ruthless pursuit of the apparatus – and financial resources – of the state.
In its misplaced focus on radical parties and policies rather than institutions of governance, the narrative of leftist revival – in Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America – fails utterly to capture such realities. So when populist leaders rant against the "market" and praise the "state", they are not really trying to understand what the role of the state should be. Rather, they are defining a chosen "enemy of the people" (businessmen, foreign and domestic – but especially foreign; the pantomime-devils of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; several hues of ill-defined, and in some cases non-existent, oligarchies).
The logical conclusion of their imaginings is a "state" in the hands of "the people" (i.e. the ruling party, its clienteles and friends), spending public funds when they are available (for the lack of funds, pace Lagos, spells the end of populism), but without feeling the need to account for such spending. After all, the new controllers of the state are "the people"; they represent the "good", and those who question their spending are the "neo-liberal" enemies and their lackeys in the press.
This type of politics is very familiar in Latin America – albeit in other guises. It has led to economic chaos, social hatred, poverty, rampant corruption, lawlessness and hyperinflation. It is far from clear that this path is not again being followed.
Those who would like to see what is going on in Latin America as the dawn of a "fraternal" leftwing politics based on ideological affinities and solidarity of "the people" might benefit from registering the difference between the much-reviled "neo-liberal" 1990s and today. Today's period of instability and confrontation contrasts with the last decade's markedly stable period in intra-regional relations.
The resurgence of the politics of nationalist populism comes hand-in-hand with the search for enemies rather than allies. As the independent institutions that can guarantee a healthy public order are left to corrode, Latin America's populists are plunging the region into a new era of suspicion, embitterment, accusation and xenophobia. For whom is this progress?